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Abstract: Donors are more likely to send aid to leaders facing elevated risks of losing power, but
targets‟ ability to benefit from this assistance is conditioned by regime type and political
processes. The institutionalization of winning coalitions‟ loyalty across regime type follows
opposite patterns, supporting opposite temporal dynamics across regime types. Democratic
leaders‟ coalitions are firmest immediately after taking office, and aid is of most assistance to
them then. As competition and dissatisfaction grows, aid becomes a political liability. In small
winning coalition systems, however, coalitions become more solid over time, facilitating
increasing benefits from aid. Without a firm coalition, however, external resources are
destabilizing to autocratic leaders. Analysis of 4,692 leader years from 1960-2001 using a
censored probit model supports these expectations.
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Many foreign policy actions are intended to reward, support or entice cooperation from
leaders of smaller states. Such “positive sanctions” include preferential trade agreements,
military alliance, and development assistance (c.f. Baldwin 1971, 1985). Indeed, wealthy and
powerful states proffer these foreign policy carrots on a regular basis, sometimes with blatantly
strategic aims. In recent years, for example, the United States has established beneficial
relationships with many Central Asian and Middle Eastern states, providing aid in return for
cooperation in the War on Terror. Even when donor nations hope to achieve more humanitarian
goals, friendly tactics possess substantial potential to alter the domestic risks of leaders. Ignoring
this capacity may obscure a mechanism essential to the ultimate success of cooperative foreign
policy.
Survival-driven leaders will weigh the personal benefits/costs generated by foreign policy
targeting. A positive sanction which does not translate into a desirable amelioration of domestic
political risks is not likely to persuade targeted leaders to make the requested changes.
Investigations of friendly foreign policy, however, usually focus on the ultimate, macro-effects
such as democratization and economic growth, leaving the potential link to leaders
understudied.1 The current project straddles this gap in our understanding of foreign policy and
leader survival, studying how the impact of cooperative foreign policy on targeted leaders is
conditioned both by institutions and political processes. Foreign aid provides an excellent
embarkation point for further investigations of the link between foreign policy and leader
survival; the advanced world invests considerable sums in development assistance, but its
effectiveness is frequently called into question by empirical studies (Chenery and Strout 1966;
Regan 1995; Geddes 1994; Kosack and Tobin 2005; Daalgard, Hansen and Tarp 2004;
Brautigam and Knack 2004).
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Below I build a theory of foreign aid as a tool of influence the effectiveness of which
depends upon domestic institutions and political processes, and the targeting of which is not
random. If this “positive sanction” (Baldwin 1985) holds the potential to assist targeted leaders
in their attempts to maintain power, then for two reasons rational donor states‟ aid monies will
likely be spent on those targets facing higher domestic risk. First, aid may represent emergency
funds to prevent the overthrow of friendly regimes. Second, those most in need may be the most
likely to be appreciative, presenting a better investment opportunity for donors.
The most direct means by which aid could benefit targeted leaders is by providing
additional resources for application to their usual tenure-seeking activities. These resources
allow some leaders to satisfy key constituencies, cementing their place in power. Raw funds,
however, are not equally fungible for all types of leaders at all points in their careers. A static
view of institutions suggests autocratic leaders will benefit more from aid. Because they are less
constrained by institutional checks, and responsible to a narrow swathe of the population,
external resources fit directly into the tenure-extension activities of small winning coalitions.
Democratic leaders, on the other hand, institutionally constrained and obligated to at least a
plurality of the voting population, have little to gain and much to lose from expropriating
development assistance for personal aggrandizement.2
Politics, however, is not static. Dynamic political processes within regime types
condition the effect of aid on leader survival. For nondemocratic leaders whose replacement is
less institutionalized, aid inflows initially produce a destabilization of political competition. The
“lootable” aspect of external resource flows encourages competition at a time when their
winning coalitions remain poorly institutionalized. With the cementing of loyalties, this
destabilizing impact reverses, allowing the utilization of aid in the manner described above.
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Democratic leaders, on the other hand, are likely to benefit from aid during their “honeymoon”.
Over time, the political opposition gains leverage over democratic leaders who have not
managed to convert aid inflows into public goods increases, turning development assistance into
a political liability.
I test these hypotheses on a dataset of 4,954 leader years covering 820 separate leaders
from 1960-2001 using a censored probit which accounts for strategic aid allocation in the
selection stage and models duration dependence in the outcome stage. In nondemocratic systems
aid can insulate long-lived leaders over time, but is dangerous for the inexperienced. The impact
on aid-receiving democratic leaders is reversed. While aid is of substantial help during the first
years, it becomes a liability over time. These findings support the expectation that development
assistance‟s effectiveness as a tool of tenure-extension will differ across institutions. The
analysis also suggests that processes of institutionalization play a formative role in the impact of
aid on recipients. Further, tests uncover evidence suggesting donor states consider the need and
likely pliancy of their targets when allocating aid. Leaders at a higher risk of losing office are
significantly more likely to receive aid than those more secure in their positions.
From 1960-2000, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
reports the donation of more than 786 billion dollars in development assistance to countries
around the world.3 Based on my results, we may conclude that much of allocated aid has fallen
in the hands of leaders who stood to gain (or lose) personally from the windfall. The cooperative
moves of powerful countries relate to the domestic politics of targeted states in real, though
complicated, ways. An understanding of the friendly foreign policy toolkit holds academic and
pragmatic value. It will help international relations scholars better explain and predict the
reactions of domestic elites, and assist policy-makers in the efficient allocation of resources
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A brief review of literature connecting leader tenure and foreign policy decisions follows.
I then elaborate the theoretical argument and hypotheses regarding the impact of institutional
arrangements and dynamic processes. In the third section I present the data and research design.
The fourth section includes discussion of the statistical results. Finally, I conclude by
considering the import of these findings for the literature and the decisions of policymakers.

Foreign Policy Targeting and Leader Survival
Most empirical investigations of leader tenure focus on domestic variables and personal
characteristics, such as: institutions, country wealth and size, economic stability and personal
time in office (Bienen and van de Walle 1992; Londregan and Poole 1990; Chiozza and Choi
2003). Despite the clear effects of internal forces, room remains for external intervention to
affect leaders‟ tenure. Whether they are designed to do so or not, many foreign policy decisions
hold the potential to help or hinder targeted elites. Studies of foreign policy and leader tenure
fixate on hostile foreign policy acts‟ potential to affect leaders by tapping into domestic
dynamics. The literature on diversionary theory, rally effects and war casualties posit that
decisions to engage in conflict affect leader duration through domestic approval (Mitchell and
Prins 2004; Lai and Reiter 2005; Mueller 1971). Rather than the success or failure of domestic
decisions, the current project investigates the impact of external decisions on leaders‟ ability to
stay in office. Research in this vein demonstrates the conditioning of the negative effect of
military and economic conflict on leader tenure by target regime type (Chiozza and Goemans
2003, 2004; McGillivray and Smith 2006; Marinov 2005).
International relations scholars often interpret the business of international politics as
essentially conflictual. Most interstate interactions, however, feature cooperation. Great powers
wield a full range of strategies for rewarding their allies and enticing future cooperation, but
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traditional studies have focused in on the macro-results or on the targeting process of these
policies, rather than the link to leaders. Studies of official development assistance, for example,
tend to focus in on the fulfillment of donors‟ humanitarian goals. Donor nations profess a desire
to improve human rights, further democratization and encourage economic stability through their
aid allocations, but success in achieving such goals remains mixed. Regarding economic growth
and stability, economists find that aid‟s impact is highly conditional on domestic socio-economic
and climatic circumstances (Chenery and Strout 1966; Burnside and Dollar 2000, 2004;
Daalgard, Hansen and Tarp 2004; Kosack and Tobin 2005). Research on the ability of aid to
promote human rights and democratization varyingly finds that assistance produces no
statistically significant improvements (Regan 1995; Knack 2004), or theorizes that inflows of
foreign money will damage democratic accountability and government capacity (Geddes 1994;
Svennson 2000; Brautigam and Knack 2004). Researchers often blame the division between
sincere humanitarian goals and strategic instrumental goals for the “failure” of donors to send aid
where it is most likely to “work” (c.f. Collier and Dollar 2002; Devarajan, Dollar and Holmgren
2001; McKinley and Little 1977).
A new strand of the literature, highly reliant upon Bueno de Mesquita and colleague‟s
“selectorate theory” (c.f. Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson and Morrow 2005), directly
entertains the link between aid and leader survival. Lai and Morey (2006) and Bueno de
Mesquita and Smith (2007, 2009) apply similar lines of reasoning to conclude that leaders who
are responsible only to a small portion of the population and thus accustomed to working for
extended tenure through private pay-offs and stockpiling, will find these activities to be directly
expanded by external resource flows. They argue also that democratic leaders, tied to the
interests of a far larger population, will find the process of parlaying aid into public goods less
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efficient. Kono and Montinola (2009) produce an extension of the selectorate model which leads
them to emphasize cumulative aid distributions over contemporary flows. In the only statistical
evaluation of this question of which the author is aware, Kono and Montinola (2009) find that
autocratic leaders are assisted by aid only in the “long term” (measured by the sum of aid
allocated to them over their tenure) while democratic leaders derive a very small benefit from aid
received more recently.
This provocative, new branch of the literature promises to generate more interest in the
future. These studies, however, fall short of an accurate representation of leaders‟ incentives
within the game of foreign aid. Though selectorate theory has redirected our attention in
profitable ways, it also tends to produce a static picture of the elites in question. Certainly,
intuition and evidence suggest that politics rarely stands still. Leaders‟ risk of losing power
changes over time (Wright 2008a; Chiozza and Goemans 2004; Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson
1995; Bienen and Van de Walle 1991), and leaders face different types of pressure at different
points in their careers. Even Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2005, 100) acknowledge it should take
some time for winning coalitions to solidify and thus for the “logic of political survival” to
manifest. Recent scholarship has incorporated leaders‟ experience in office as a theoretical
explanation for conflict behavior (c.f. Gelpi and Grieco 2001; Chiozza and Choi 2003; Wolford
2007). Most pertinent to the project at hand Wright (2008) considers the impact of survival
probability on the likelihood of autocratic leaders expropriating aid monies to private purposes
vs. funneling them into growth-producing endeavors.
Furthermore, analyses of aid‟s impact on leader tenure must also consider the strategic
incentives of donor states. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2007, 2009) demonstrated that
allocation patterns appear to be driven by calculation of the leverage likely to result. If donors

7
send aid in the hopes of achieving something, then two types of endogeneity will surface in the
analysis of aid and leader survival. Most obviously, the “treatment” of development assistance
has not been randomly assigned. Leaders who get aid are different from leaders who do not.
Their countries are likely more poor, possibly less free, and probably closer to conflict. This
pattern of strategic allocation creates a non-random sample of aid-receiving elites and may
interfere with estimation strategies which do not correct for the selection. The possibility of
donors considering the level of risk faced by prospective targets introduces a second possible
source of endogeneity. Donors who intend to shore up friendly administrations abroad would be
foolish to spend their money on the well-entrenched. Further, those looking for the type of aidfor-policy deals discussed by Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2007, 2009) should look to leaders
with elevated risk at home. The over-comfortable leader has little need of aid‟s tenure-extending
promises and is, thus, generally unlikely to find aid worth the domestic trouble of changing
policies. The group of aid-receiving leaders, then, may face higher levels of risk ex ante.
In the argument developed below, I tackle these theoretical and statistical challenges,
incorporating the expectations of selectorate theory with the recognition of over-time dynamics
and strategic allocation. Donors send aid where they believe it to be of most strategic use, while
both institutions and temporal political processes condition the role aid plays in reducing
recipients‟ risks. Testing this argument requires explicit modeling of both possible endogenous
processes and of temporal dynamics. Following the theory section, I introduce an appropriate
statistical model.

Coming Into Money
This theory shares two foundational assumptions with the selectorate theory (Bueno de
Mesquita et al. 2005). First, leaders are rational and survival-driven, acting so as to stay in

8
power as long as possible. As no secondary political goals can be obtained without this prior
condition, leaders always have the incentive to decrease their risk of losing office. Second, all
leaders owe their place in power to a portion of the population (the winning coalition) whose
support is critical to the defeat of political challenges. The size of this core constituency is
determined by institutions. The survival problem, for all leaders, involves the setting of a budget
which maximizes the utility of the winning coalition through a mix of private and public goods.
One of the most frequently cited conclusions of the selectorate model is the tendency for
those leaders with small winning coalitions to allocate more private goods; those with big
winning coalitions, more public goods (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005, 79-93). Intuitively, raw
resources spread amongst a group provide less utility as the size of the group increases.
Provision of private goods becomes prohibitively expensive for democratic leaders, whose
winning coalition consists of a plurality of the adult population. Autocratic leaders, in contrast,
are rarely responsible to more than a handful of powerful military, economic or party elites. This
variation in relative size defines leaders‟ tenure-extending activities. For democratic leaders, the
survival-motive requires maximization of public goods; for autocratic leaders, private pay-offs to
the winning coalition (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005). Consequently, each individual member
of a small winning coalition receives a higher payoff, and the gap between members and nonmembers increases.
Coupled with a higher likelihood of being excluded from future winning coalitions
should their leader be defeated, this discrepancy engenders a high level of loyalty (Bueno de
Mesquita et al. 2005, 92-93). Public goods produce nonexcludable benefits, meaning the perks
of winning coalition membership decrease with the size of the group. The strength of the loyalty
norm decreases in turn, producing a much higher baseline risk of losing office for democratic
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leaders (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005, 93). By affecting the loyalty norm, relative winning
coalition size also determines the amount of overall spending required. When loyalty is high
(winning coalition small), leaders may safely reserve more of the state budget for personal use
“…if they find themselves at risk of being deposed” (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005, 93). Thus,
autocratic leaders‟ tenure-extending activities also involve the stockpiling of resources, while
democratic leaders must commit to spend nearly all of their resources to fending off challengers
in a low-loyalty system (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2007, 259).
Departing from Bueno de Mesquita et al., however, I also assume that dynamic processes
of learning and institutionalization intervene, changing the optimal strategies and the competency
of their pursuit over time. Working from these basic precepts, I explore the likely role of aid in
the survival problem of targeted elites. I begin with a discussion of strategic actions in the
allocation process. The theory proceeds to the target‟s incentives, considering the basic reason
why aid should matter. Then, I outline the expectations of aid‟s impact on survival based on a
static formulation of selectorate theory. Finally, I present an argument for the mediating effect
of dynamic processes on leaders‟ ability to benefit from external assistance.
Aid Allocation
Donor states do not send their money overseas without expectations attached. Dudley
and Montmarquette (1976) profess the conventional wisdom on foreign aid most succinctly:
“…people usually give because they expect to get something in return. … in practice very few
transfers are unilateral” (133). While the types of “return” may vary along the spectrum of
humanitarian vs. strategic, donor states should be expected to allocate aid somewhat rationally.
Consider two principle motivations for the allocation of official development assistance:
(1) propping up friendly administrations abroad, and (2) “purchasing” policy concessions.
Strategic donors will not pursue the first goal without considering whether the target requires the
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proffered assistance. Leaders enjoying rock-solid domestic situations have less need for external
help than do those facing rocky times. If foreign aid operates to decrease targets‟ risks, then it
will be best allocated to those leaders who have some domestic risks.
In the second case, an aid-for-policy deal such as those discussed by Bueno de Mesquita
and Smith (2007, 2009), donors allocate aid as a salve to offset the costs of providing a suboptimal change in policy. This change may be purely strategic, but it need not be. Much
development assistance, for example, arrives with stipulations for economic reform aimed at
alleviating poverty and stimulating growth. To the extent that such concessions alter the status
quo, they are politically costly for targets, at least in the short run. Leaders whose domestic
prospects are good have little motivation to commit to these potential costs. Likelihood of losing
office cannot decrease indefinitely; it is bounded. Leaders who are already secure, then, will
reap little additional benefit from aid monies. Without elevated fear of losing office, the valueadded from receipt of aid will likely fail to off-set the costs of concessions.
Given the dynamics of survival-motivated leaders, therefore, we should expect donors to
look for opportunities where targets perceive a need for external assistance. Receiving elites are
likely to be most receptive to the requests of donor nations when domestic mechanisms of
support falter. Moreover, donors sometimes specifically intend their aid-monies to substitute for
domestic support. Strategic donors, then, may choose to send aid more frequently to high risk
cases.
H1: Aid allocation is more likely for leaders facing higher risks of losing office.
Foreign Aid and Leader Survival
Beginning with a survival-driven leader turns our interest to the means by which aid
could contribute to a reduction in the risk of losing office. As a positive sanction, foreign aid
may communicate the good will of the international community (Baldwin 1985). It may come
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with many strings attached; donor nations expect to see infrastructure development, improved
human rights reports or lower malnutrition levels. But its concrete ramifications for survival
stem from its ability to augment existing tenure-extension activities, a capacity referred to here
as fungibility. The principle of fungibility can be understood quite literally. Reporting
requirements may not be strict enough to prevent some of the money from disappearing;
institutions in the developing world are infamously opaque, making its path very hard to trace.
But the conversion of aid to personal benefit need not be dollar for dollar. Donors may
restrict the direct diversion of foreign money to other purposes – whether by delivering actual
goods or funneling provisions through nongovernmental organizations – without negating the
instrumental benefit of aid. Describing fungibility, Kosack and Tobin (2005, 210) note “… [aid]
ends up largely substituting for government spending that would have occurred anyway, thereby
freeing up government monies to be spent as the government wants.” An influx of extra money
for infrastructure development or welfare programs liberates domestic funds which might
previously have been allocated to these sectors. If an outside power is feeding the people, the
government need not. Empirical research supports the suspicion that aid operates to the benefit
of local elites rather than to that of their populations or donors (Pack and Pack 1993; Boone
1995; Feyzioglu, Swaroop and Zhu 1998; Kosack and Tobin 2005).
Whether through direct diversion or budgetary substitution, survival-driven elites aim to
convert some portion of aid into reduced risk through reinforcement of their supporters‟ loyalty.
No matter how restricted the system, political competition exists. For example, within one-party
systems such as Japan under the Liberal Democratic Party rival factions develop and compete for
top positions. The solidity of one‟s political support base, therefore, is the first line of defense
for survival-minded leaders. In the language of selectorate theory, loss of even a small portion of
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the winning coalition may result in the victory of a challenger. When loyalty in the winning
coalition drops, legislative coalitions deteriorate, coup-makers recruit successfully,
demonstrators gather in the street, and parties lose elections. Pleasing the winning coalition is
not necessarily a ticket to overall domestic stability. In small winning coalition systems, the gap
between the ruling elite and the people widens as loyalty-generating private transfers enrich the
ruler‟s supporters. This may make for an inherently unstable situation as grievances develop and
proliferate. But, for individual leaders, a happy, loyal winning coalition is a necessary – though
not sufficient – condition for staying in office.
It follows that aid-receiving leaders will attempt to exploit fungibility to bolster their
supporters‟ loyalty. Selectorate theory‟s view of leader strategy suggests their success in this
endeavor will vary by regime type. Institutions of leader selection determine the effectiveness of
raw funds for purchasing continued tenure. Autocratic leaders responsible to the military and
business elite could expect a much bigger bang for their buck than democratic leaders
responsible to a plurality of their electorate (c.f. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007, 2009).
Institutions and the Fungibility of Aid
Given these dynamics, foreign aid will factor differently into leaders‟ attempts to extend
tenure. Under conditions of small winning coalition and high loyalty, aid presents a potentially
valuable tool. An increase in available raw funds translates directly into higher pay-offs for
winning coalition members, without necessitating a cut in stockpiles. Aid, then, can assist
nondemocratic leaders directly in both the cultivation of winning coalition satisfaction and in the
accumulation of resources to counteract exogenous shocks (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007;
Lai and Morey 2006).
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For democratic leaders, however, the ability of aid monies to contribute to winning
coalition satisfaction may be stunted. The obligation to a large proportion of the population
makes allocation of private goods inefficient. They must commit to spend nearly all government
resources, yet the public goods provided disperse equally amongst the entire population,
diminishing private perks for supporters and deadening loyalty (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005,
92-98). Any newly arriving resources must be turned towards the overarching goal of shoring up
support in the interest of tenure, and this means providing further public benefits. But
development assistance may prove an unreliable tool of democratic tenure extension.
Foreign aid boasts only a patchy record of public goods provision. Economic growth, for
example, tends to follow aid allocation only in already thriving economies with good macroeconomic policy (Burnside and Dollar 2004; Kosack and Tobin 2005). Democratic leaders who
are providing high levels of public goods, and thus already enjoy a relatively low risk of losing
office, may manage to coax some additional public benefit out of aid flows. Leaders presiding
over weak economies, and thus facing higher risks, cannot make external funds work to their
advantage. Given that a weak economy is consistently a key predictor of aid allocation (c.f. Lai
2003), aid will often have little or no discernable impact on existing levels of public goods.
Since funneling aid into further public goods provision may prove ineffective for
extending tenure, democratic leaders could sometimes prefer to funnel it into private benefits for
key political players. Consider, for example, the behavior of President Chiluba (1991-2001) in
Zambia. Ex-post investigations by Transparency International have revealed that the President
maintained a “… slush fund … to appropriate public funds and „dole‟ them out to favored or
politically useful persons or groups without accounting for them,” and that “Parliament allowed
criminal funds to be operated throughout President Chiluba‟s tenure of office” (Yambayamba
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2007, 5). The temptation and the actuality of such corruption exist in democracies. At the
beginning of Chiluba‟s tenure, Zambia fell within the realm of democracy by the most
commonly utilized measure in international relations scholarship, scoring a 6 on the Polity2
composite scale (Marshall and Jaggers 2003). Over the course of his term, however, the
President‟s corruption assisted in the deterioration of governance in Zambia to a mixed score.
Democratic leaders operating in better institutionalized systems, however, face significant
institutional barriers which make corruption an inefficient strategy.
In consolidated democracies the oversight rights of other branches, freedom of the press
and the rule of law constrain the executive (c.f. Linz and Stepan 1996, 7-14). When functioning
properly and in conjunction, these characteristics should make it very difficult for leaders to
divert aid monies and very politically costly to be caught in the attempt. In short, savvy
democratic elites know that their institutional environment encourages continued democratic
behavior (Gates, Hegre, Jones and Strand 2006); diverting foreign aid directly to personal
aggrandizement is simply not the most efficient way for them to utilize their resources.
For autocratic leaders, on the other hand, the line between state funds and private funds is
blurry at best. Little domestic cost exists to prevent the efficient conversion of aid to private
goods and benefits. A leader like the Congo‟s Mobutu Sese Seku simply delivers envelopes full
of money to key elites in order to purchase their loyalty (Wrong 2007, 22). Regime type
conditions incentives by determining both the ease of diverting aid money to private use and the
effectiveness of such a strategy. For autocratic leaders, the conversion of aid to increased tenure
is straightforward and should be relatively effective. Democratic leaders attempting to channel
aid to personal benefit face dimmer prospects. The institutional argument produces the
following hypotheses:
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H2: The receipt of foreign aid will decrease the risks of autocratic leaders.
H3: The receipt of foreign aid will decrease the risks of democratic leaders less
than it does nondemocratic leaders.
Dynamic Political Processes and Aid
Dynamic political processes further condition the ability of recipient elites to benefit from
aid allocations. Leaders‟ risks do not remain fixed at the same level on their first and last days of
office. Through general processes such as learning and institutionalization, politics moves.
Underlying the particular circumstances and exogenous shocks of any given career, these general
social processes contribute to the empirically noted declining baseline risk of losing office over
time (Chiozza and Goemans 2004; Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995; Bienen and Van de
Walle 1991). These processes also alter the impact of aid on recipients. Over time leaders‟ base
of support follows a social process of institutionalization and decline. This process, shaped by
the institutional pattern of competition, determines individuals‟ willingness to develop loyalty.
Institutionalization can be thought of as producing changes in the “need to please” one‟s
winning coalition over time. For autocratic leaders, it takes time for confidence and loyalty to
build due to the high risks of exclusion in the future. Newly instated nondemocratic leaders are
the challenger described by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2005,) as unable to firmly demonstrate
sufficient “affinity” for initial winning coalition members. Because some members of the new
coalition remain uncertain as to their future membership, they will be more easily poached by
early challengers. “Lootable”, externally-derived aid resources may exacerbate the number and
intensity of these initial challenges. Challengers can credibly promise uncertain members of the
incumbent coalition a greater portion of aid resources. If able to hang on to power, however,
nondemocratic leaders will dole out aid resources in the manner described in the previous
section, creating a stronger and stronger bond between themselves and their coalition over time.
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Democratic leaders‟ winning coalitions, in contrast, are likely to be most supportive and
generous in their interpretation of performance immediately following the winning of office.
The process of political campaign and election is essentially an exercise in the mobilization and
cementing of political coalitions. Victory provides an intense burst of energy and cohesion. The
popularity of elected officials is at its highest while the public remains under the influence of this
feeling. During this “honeymoon” the competition finds it socially distasteful to comment
negatively and mainstream media, consequently, present almost entirely positive evaluations of
the new leader/government (Brody 1992, 27-44; Lockerbie, Borreli and Hedger 1998). This
favorable climate does not last. As time progresses, public approval lags, opening the door for
legal political competition to further wear away at that support; political actors, finding their
share of policy goods or power unsatisfying, criticize incumbent policy choices and performance
(Altman 2000; Bearce and Hinckley 1992, 21-44 and 60-74; Light 1999, 36). In both
presidential and coalition systems, these dynamics contribute to an increasing hazard of failure
for democratically elected leaders (Warwick 1992; Altman 2000).
Because the public and the competition are inclined to feel favorably about democratic
leaders earlier in their tenure than later, foreign aid may be of most assistance during the
democratic honeymoon. Even if aid does not produce substantial results during this time,
observers may be willing to credit the leader with having obtained the funds or with maintaining
friendly international relations. Over time, the natural process of political competition may
combine negatively with the limited public returns of the received aid. Apparent inability to
make aid “work” for the people over time provides the competition with a ready-made critique,
especially if conditionality agreements have not been met. Even if aid has produced some public
goods improvement, democratic leaders may find it difficult to claim credit. Many public
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benefits attributable to aid monies, such as infrastructure or education improvements, trickle
down through government agencies or are provided directly by foreign nongovernmental
organizations. The line of attribution in these cases does not point unambiguously back to the
head of government, but branches out to external powers, bureaucrats and other government
figures. Further, development assistance as a resource is not unique to the leader in power at the
time of receipt. The extreme rarity of donor nations reducing aid amounts following democratic
turnover bolsters domestic competition‟s ability to credibly promise to perform at least as well as
the incumbent.4 The effect of foreign aid on democratic leaders, then, may be expected to
change over time: initially it will be beneficial, but in the long run aid allocations may hurt.
Over-time dynamics in loyalty produce the following hypotheses:
H4: The ability of aid to insulate democratic leaders will decrease over time.
H5: The ability of aid to insulate autocratic leaders will increase over time.

Modeling Leader Survival
The data upon which this argument is tested consist of 4,692 leader years covering 791
separate leaders from 1960-2001. Data on these leaders come from Goemans, Gleditsch and
Chiozza‟s (2006) dataset on the survival of leaders, Archigos version 2.5. Leaders of countries
which donated aid in the current year have been excluded from the analysis in order to preserve a
reasonable comparison category. Discrete event history data such as these require modeling of
duration dependence (c.f. Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, 69-84; Beck, Katz and Tucker
1998). Given the strategic allocation of aid monies, the data also require a selection stage (c.f.
Heckman 1979). Aid fails to be allocated in 543 of the leader years in question.
The censored probit model provides a straightforward means of addressing both problems
simultaneously (c.f. Dubin and Rivers 1989).5 This model simultaneously estimates two
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equations, one for selection the other for an outcome of interest. The selection stage will be
allocation of aid; outcome, failure by collapse of winning coalition. To control for the
expectation that donors allocate aid to leaders with higher likelihood of failure, an endogenous
instrument technique will be applied in the selection stage (c.f. Maddala 1986). This involves
obtaining probabilities of failure for each observation from the outcome stage and adjusting by
the error of prediction.
The outcome stage of the censored probit will model leader failure as a function of aid‟s
changing impact over time and across regime type. Institutional and temporal conditioning will
be modeled through interaction effects. First, aid will be interacted with an indicator of regime
type, then with the natural log of the targeted leader‟s experience in office. Conveniently,
controlling for duration dependence can be accomplished simply by including the constitutive
term for the time-aid interaction. Though studies often employ a more complex function of time
– using cubic splines, cubic polynomials or estimating a separate slope coefficient for every year
in analysis – the duration dependence in this data appears to be well captured by the logarithmic
function.6 Below, I discuss specific measurement choices.
1st Stage Measurement:
The selection stage dependent variable is an indicator tagging whether the leader received
a non-zero value of net official development assistance in the given year, based on the OECD‟s
reporting. Given the high level of bureaucratic inertia in aid allocation processes, another
indicator variable tags observations which received aid in the previous year.
The key theoretical variable for the selection equation is an estimate of leaders‟ baseline
probability of losing office. Within the latent variable framework used by Maddala (1986, 242247), the outcome stage of our censored probit model estimates a continuous, latent variable of
the probability of losing office. Recognizing this indicates the need to correct for this recursive

19
relationship between the two stages using an instrument. Maddala (1986, 246) recommends
estimating the outcome stage, calculating a predicted value, and adjusting by the standard error
of the prediction. Table 1 reports the probit coefficients utilized in this process. In order to
calculate values of the instrument for observations which do not receive aid, this regression
utilizes an adjusted measure of aid. The final outcome equation uses the natural log of aid
divided by gross domestic product. The measure in Table 1 adds one to the aid measure before
taking the log, which prevents zeros from dropping out of analysis. The instrument, Z, ranges
from -31 to just over 2. These values correspond to a range of predicted probabilities of failure
from nearly zero to 0.66. Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between the instrument and the
more intuitive concept of the predicted probability of failure.
To account for more traditional explanations of aid allocation, I include a number of
control variables. As an indicator of humanitarian need, I include lagged population growth
taken from the World Development Indicators. This variable is highly correlated with other
measures of need, notably birthrate and infant mortality, but has substantially better coverage.
Donors‟ commercial interests are captured by a logged measure of the value of imports from
OECD donors received by the target in the prior year (Gleditsch 2002). Prior work on aid
allocation in the selectorate theory school has found that donors tend to send aid to smaller
coalition systems (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007, 2009). I control for this using the ordinal
measure of Bueno de Mesquita et al‟s (2005) winning coalition concept, W. Other indicators of
strategic interest include: an indicator of internationalized civil war from the Uppsala Conflict
Data Project (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg and Strand 2002), an indicator of
former colonial status, an indicator for oil production capacity (Energy Information
Administration 2009), and one for a defensive or offensive alliance tie to one of the OECD
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donors (Leeds, Ritter, Mitchell, and Long 2002). Finally, I also incorporate a measure of logged
population (Gleditsch 2002).
2nd Stage Measurement:
Most studies of leader survival utilize Goemans, Gleditsch and Chiozza‟s (2006)
indicator of leader failure as a dependent variable, excluding deaths from natural causes. For the
theory at hand, this variable contains noise.1 We are concerned here with the process of
maintaining one‟s winning coalition. Thus the exits of leaders leaving of their own volition or as
proscribed by constitutional term limits do not indicate “failure”. Accounting for this problem
required investigation of the circumstances of exit for the leaders within my dataset which
Archigos coded as “regular”. These regular exits include term limits, impeachments, coalition
dissolutions, elections and resignations. I code both the situation of exit and the relationship
between the entering and the exiting leader. Using this additional information I code an indicator
for winning coalition failure. It obtains under two conditions: irregular replacement, or
replacement by an actor who is not an heir/successor.2 The natural log of the Archigos variable
sumten, which tracks the cumulative days of a leader‟s stay in office, is used both to deal with
duration dependence and to explicitly allow the effect of aid to vary over time. The logarithmic
functional form fits the expectations of institutionalization, as it will allow for diminishing
effects over time as the changes slow.
The basic data on aid, available from 1960, come from the OECD‟s online database. The
operationalization of aid begins with OECD‟s total net official development assistance variable,

1

I am grateful to an astute reviewer for bringing this problem to my attention.
Entering leaders can relate to the exiting leader in three ways. “Heir/Successors” come from the same party,
administration or the family of the exiting leader. “Challengers” come from opposing parties, rival factions within
the dominant party, or the military. The “Neutral parties” coding is used when party affiliation cannot be
determined or when an interim ruling coalition is put in place. Unless an heir/successor takes over following termlimits or resignation I code winning coalition failure as 1.
2
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which includes bilateral aid disbursements from all OECD donor countries. Following several
empirical analyses (Knack 2004; Daalgard et al. 2004; Lai 2003; Boone 1995), I adjust my aid
measure in two ways. First, size of economy is accounted for by dividing aid per capita by gross
domestic product per capita in millions of constant US dollars. Second, a logarithmic a
transformation corrects for heavy skew and diminishing returns. To capture any changing
influence of aid over time, this variable is interacted with the log of time.
An indicator for big winning coalition/democratic institutions comes from the Bueno de
Mesquita et al. (2005) W measure. When W exceeds .75, Wbig equals one. I utilize a
dichotomous measure here rather than the ordinal scale, because my theoretical expectations
describe discrete forms of behavior rather than a range of behaviors. I posit that the institutions
of democracy, associated with the biggest W values, create a qualitatively different process.
Control variables include economic variables from Gleditsch‟s (2002) expanded trade
and economic data: lagged GDP growth, and lagged total trade in current year US dollars. The
natural log of population also comes from the Gleditsch data. Domestic challenges are captured
by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program‟s measure of level of civil conflict, including the values:
0, no conflict; 1, minor conflict producing at least 25 deaths; 2, civil war producing at least 1,000
deaths. Regional dummy variables based on Hensel‟s (1994) coding have also been included.

Findings
Analysis of the statistical results will begin by assessing the appropriateness of the
endogenous modeling techniques. Table 2 contains the coefficients and fit information from the
censored probit of aid allocation and winning coalition failure with an endogenous instrument in
the selection stage. The Wald statistic reported at the bottom of this table is highly significant,
indicating a correlation between the processes. This indicates the appropriateness of the
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censored model. Secondly, the instrumented probability of failure used in the allocation model is
highly significant, indicating the presence of a second endogenous process.
Aid allocation stage results lie in the second column of Table 2.3 The analysis suggests
that strategic concerns weigh heavily on the decision to allocate aid. A state which did not
receive aid in the previous period is significantly more likely to do so if their leader faces
elevated risks of losing office. Increasing risks of winning coalition failure steeply increases the
probability of receiving aid, as illustrated in the left panel of Figure 1. This figure charts the
probability of allocation from the minimum value of the instrument for probability failure to the
minimum value within its 90th percentile. For ease of interpretation, I have transformed the
instrument values to corresponding probabilities of failure by taking the normal probability of
the product of the instrument and the standard error of prediction. Leaders facing a 40% risk of
coalition failure will receive aid with a probability of 76%. Corresponding to the postulated
logic, leaders with risks near zero have almost zero likelihood of receiving aid. Hypothesis 1
receives considerable support from these results; donors appear to favor leaders experiencing
personal need of aid‟s potentially insulating effects. Of course, at this stage we can conclude
neither that aid actually reduces recipients‟ risks of losing power, nor that those leaders who are
facing higher risks exhibit higher levels of compliance with donor requests. From the selection
stage, we can merely observe findings consistent with a strategic allocation process.
Donors do appear more likely to send aid to needy countries, based on the positive
coefficient for population growth. The magnitude of this effect, however, is smaller than that of
the leader-level strategic variable. The predicted probabilities given values of need from the
minimum to 90th percentile are displayed in the right panel of Figure 2. Across this range,
variable‟s impact changes by only 39 points. At the high value of population growth, probability
3

See supplementary materials for independent probit regression and fit statistics at the allocation stage.
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of allocation is little better than a coin flip at 50.6%. Most other variables within the selection
equation achieve significance in the expected direction. Former colonial ties and strong alliances
with donor states both increase the likelihood of aid allocation. Imports may be a better measure
of development than of donors‟ commercial interests; importing more from OECD states leads to
lower probabilities of receiving aid. The model also confirms Bueno de Mesquita and Smith‟s
(2007, 2009) contention that donors send aid more frequently to small winning coalition states.
Having evaluated H1 and found significant support, we may move on to consider the
remaining four hypotheses regarding the role of institutions and temporal dynamics. The
winning coalition failure model in the first column of Table 2 contains the coefficients of interest
for these hypothesis tests. As discussed above, the log of time models baseline duration
dependence. Similar to many previous studies (c.f. Chiozza and Goemans 2004; Bueno de
Mesquita and Siverson 1995; Bienen and Van de Walle 1991), this coefficient indicates that the
risks of losing office decrease over time as leaders become more cemented in power.
The aid terms feature two layers of multiplicative effect. First, the continuous aid
variable has been interacted with a dummy for regime type. Then these two terms are further
interacted with the natural log of time. Thus, aid interacted with Wbig describes the effect of aid
when winning coalitions are big and the log of time equals zero; this will generally refer to
democratic aid-recipients on their first day in office. The aid constituent term references aid‟s
effect on leaders with small winning coalition systems on their first day in office. To make this
more obvious I have labeled the rows as to what type of leader each term references. With each
unit increase in time, the slopes indicated by the aid and aid*Wbig terms shift by the magnitude
of the coefficients of the interaction with time.
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While these coefficients themselves do not provide much intuitive information they can
be of assistance in preliminary evaluation of hypotheses four and five. We may note first of all,
that all four coefficients achieve high levels of statistical significance. Aid exerts an observable
impact on leaders on its first day of receipt, but the change in this impact over time is also
distinguishable from zero. Consistent with expectations, aid decreases the risks of democratic
leaders initially – indicated by the negative coefficient for aid to big winning coalition systems.
The immediate impact for small winning coalition leaders is a significant increase in risk of
coalition failure, marked by the positive sign of aid to small winning coalition systems.7 And,
over time, the positive coefficient on the log of time interaction marks a diminishing of aid‟s
benefits for the big winning coalition systems. Meanwhile the negative sign of aid to small
coalition systems times the log of experience shows developing benefits for the small coalition
systems
From this initial evaluation of the coefficients, we glean information supportive of H4
and H5. It appears that autocratic leaders do experience an initial destabilization with benefits
developing over time. Following the opposite pattern, democratic leaders benefit up front but
experience a diminishing effect. Evaluating the significance of these trends at specific points in
time as well as the general impact of aid postulated by the static winning coalition argument (H2
and H3) requires more work. Given the complicated interaction effects, further investigation
using measures of substantive significance is well-advised (c.f. Brambor, Clark and Golder 2006;
Kam and Franzese 2007). To provide an intuitive representation of aid‟s dynamic effects, I
calculated the change in probability of failure over time for ideal types of big winning coalition
and small winning coalition leaders. The probability of failure was calculated first with aid at
one standard deviation above the mean and then at the mean level.8 The difference of these two
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quantities provides an interesting indication of aid‟s substantive impact. Confidence in the
accuracy of the calculation was increased using Monte Carlo techniques to draw a large sample
of beta coefficients from the variance-covariance matrix of the censored probit model. The
calculation, repeated 100 times, was made on a sample of 100 observations, identical except for
the estimated coefficients. This procedure provides 10,000 observations of the percent change in
probability of failure for each type of leader. The reported statistic is the mean prediction from
the sample, with 95% confidence intervals. A negative difference indicates that the probability
of failure was lower at high levels of aid; a positive difference, that risks were lower at the mean
level of aid.
Figure 3 charts these first differences across temporal ranges appropriate to the regime
type. For democratic leaders, 99% of cases fail prior to the 18th year in power, so the x-axis
ends at that point. This visual representation provides considerable additional evidence in favor
of H4. For democratic leaders, whose winning coalition is most charitable early in the term,
higher levels of foreign aid produce lower risks of losing office only in the early years. The
insulation effect is substantial, with risks in the first days of office reduced by 60%. The decay
in benefits proceeds steeply, however. Within two years and nine months, the confidence
intervals include zero. Another six months brings a significant risk-increasing effect, which tops
out at a 26% increase for the longest-enduring democratic leaders. The dotted, gray, vertical line
in the figure represents the 50th percentile in big winning coalition leader tenure. It matches
almost perfectly to the point at which aid‟s effect becomes destabilizing.
Figure 3 also provides support for H5, demonstrating a significant destabilizing effect
which diminishes over time. Receiving aid during the first days of tenure increases a
nondemocratic leader‟s likelihood of coalition failure by 27%. This dangerous impact reverses,
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but at a leisurely pace. Leaders must cling to power for 17 ½ years before the destabilizing
effect loses significance. At this point 83% of autocratic leaders would already have lost office.
The insulating effect reaches 11.7% at its highest point, corresponding to the very rare occasion
of 46 years in office.
While this analysis provides significant support for the dynamic hypotheses four and five,
it contradicts the basic winning coalition arguments voiced in H2 and H3. Democratic leaders
stand to benefit much more from aid than do their small winning coalition counterparts, at least
for a couple of years. The insulation effect in the first two years of a big winning coalition
system outstrips that available to nondemocratic leaders both in magnitude – 60% compared to
11.7% – and in the proportion of leaders likely to experience it – 50% versus 17%.
Temporal Dynamics vs. The End of the Cold War
A growing number of theoretical and empirical works contend that patterns of aid
allocation and aid effectiveness altered with the end of the Cold War and superpower politics
(c.f. Bermeo 2008; Bearce and Tirone 2008; Berthelemy 2006; Berthelemy and Tichit 2004;
Burnside and Dollar 2004). Scholars in this emerging school of thought have found evidence
that donors in the 1990s and onwards exhibit greater likelihood of: allocating to more
democratic countries with better macroeconomic and human rights policies, breaking off aid to
states which do not meet agreements, and of behaving less “strategically” in the Cold War sense.
If these arguments hold weight, then the pattern of endogenous processes could differ in the Cold
War as opposed to the “New World Order” of the 1990s. Table 3 contains models run on the
sub-sample of Cold War and New World Order years.
The strategic behavior of donor states does appear to have changed after the fall of the
Soviet Union. In the 1990s model the correlation between allocation and outcome stage fails to
achieve significance. While higher risk leaders are still more likely to receive aid, the effect is
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less significant than during the Cold War. This difference in statistical significance suggests that
donors‟ behavior has become less consistent regarding the desirability of distressed targets. In
future analyses it may be profitable to disaggregate OECD bilateral aid by donor and investigate
differences in strategy.
The general pattern of aid‟s dynamic effect across institutions holds across the eras.
Autocrats are initially destabilized, with the harmful effect diminishing over time; democrats‟
initial insulation decays over time. After 1990, however, the initial insulating effect on
democratic leaders is smaller in magnitude and much less significant (β= -.2820, p=.092
compared to β= -.4658, p=.003). The overtime drag on this effect fails to reach statistical
significance (p=.115). Some portion of the inefficiency in the post-Cold War model may come
from the considerably reduced sample size, with less than half the number of observations in this
time period as opposed to the nearly 30 years of Cold War politics.

Conclusion
Too, often in the field of international relations, we focus only on the conflictual
behaviors of the great powers while ignoring their extensive repertoire of friendly foreign policy
tools. The research presented here demonstrates the need to expand the scope of our analysis:
pacific foreign policy decisions exert real effects on the politics of weaker countries. Institutions
and political dynamics within targeted states, however, exert strong and interesting conditioning
upon the outcomes of foreign policy strategies. My analyses have demonstrated a political
impact within states targeted by foreign policy, but this impact varies given the institutions of
representation, and the experience of the receiving leader. Aid can significantly shore up the
career of new democratic leaders, insulating them from the threat of winning coalition failure by
up to 60%. But, if arriving late, aid can also cause problems for those responsible to a large
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coalition of supporters. Ironically, foreign assistance causes serious problems for the small
winning coalition leaders who accept it. A destabilization of 30% may follow from receipt of a
generous amount of aid.
The findings reported here contribute a new dimension to our understanding of foreign
policy, and of foreign aid in particular. Extant studies have considered a static picture of politics
within target states. But the abilities and resources of politicians change over time in systematic
ways about which we can theorize. More generally, the realm of friendly foreign policy effects
deserves more scholarly attention, not least of all because it constitutes a significant public
expenditure for many western nations. Studies of alternative strategies, such as military
assistance and diplomatic support, should be investigated to determine whether a similar pattern
holds.
More immediately, however, this analysis raises intriguing questions about the policy
outcomes of aid allocation. When leaders receive aid that helps them hold onto power, does this
translate to higher compliance with donor requests? When it hurts, do targets become more
recalcitrant? Why take money which spawns dangerous levels of instability and competition?
And, while on the surface it seems positive that aid tends to make democratic leaders more
secure, this need not be the case. The insulation of status quo administrations may also explain
findings that donor goals of democratization (Knack 2004) and human rights improvements fail
to be achieved (Regan 1995). Alternatively, the swift decay of the helpful effect into a political
liability may be undergirded by increases in corruption and scandal as democrats utilize fungible
aid monies to enrich themselves and their closest supporters. A parallel argument may be made
for the seeming positive of aid‟s destabilizing effect on more autocratic leaders. The fall of such
leaders does not necessarily imply the instatement of democracy. If these leaders are replaced by
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more of the same, aid may prove different than the traditional “resource curse” only in that it
could have been prevented.
While research on this topic continues, allocation of development assistance is not likely
to pause and await our final conclusions. In the meantime, policymakers motivated by
humanitarian rather than strategic goals would be well-advised to reconsider the merit of
political leaders who receive aid monies. To make good foreign policy we must consider the
institutional incentives of elites on the receiving end. For donors interested in the
democratization and political progress of democratizing or autocratic regimes, aid may be an
inappropriate policy tool. Rather, as indicated by previous studies (c.f. Burnside and Dollar
2000, 2004), it may be necessary to hold off on the delivery of assistance until serious political
reform has already taken place. The dynamics of political processes in the target states should
also be considered. Democratic leaders beyond their first term in power may be better assisted
with another type of friendly foreign policy tool rather than foreign aid.
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1

To the author‟s knowledge only one published study exists which directly investigates aid‟s impact on leader

survival (Kono and Montinola 2009). That study applies a straightforward extension of Bueno de Mesquita et al‟s
(2003) selectorate theory, without accounting for over-time processes as I do here.
2

For the sake of style, I vary my terminology about institutions. Throughout I will use the terms democratic and

large winning coalition systems interchangeably. Similarly, I utilize the terms nondemocratic, autocratic, small
winning coalition and authoritarian to refer to the same concept.
3

This figure is reported in constant 2000 US dollars adjusted for inflation.

5

Dubin and Rivers (1989) give the censored probit likelihood function as the following:

6

The baseline survival function estimated from the data using a Cox model with specification identical to the

outcome equation estimated below produces the function pictured in Figure A1 in the appendix of supplementary
materials. The reader should note that it is a relatively smooth function, with steep initial decline which diminishes.
The logarithmic function is very similar. For those still concerned that the function is too simple to capture duration
dependence, the results have also been estimated using a cubic polynomial. These regression results are available
upon request. All key relationships are robust to this alteration in specification. .
7

This is actually the constituent term for aid. To assist readers in interpretation, I have labeled variables by the

population to which they refer.
8

Timpone (2002) gives the formula for predicted probabilities from the censored probit model as:

Where the subscript “s” indicates the selection equation and “o” indicates the outcome equation; ρ is the correlation
between the errors of the two equations.
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Table 1. Probit Regression of Winning Coalition Failure, Including Non-Aid Recipients
0.2895***
Logged Aid/GDP to Small Winning Coalition Systems
(0.0837)
Ln(time)*Logged Aid/GDP to Small Winning Coalition
-0.0284**
Systems
(0.0113)
-0.6358***
Logged Aid/GDP to Big Winning Coalition Systems
(0.1226)
Ln(time)*Logged Aid/GDP to Big Winning Coalition
0.0740***
Systems
(0.0176)
0.5697***
Big Winning Coalition
(0.1095)
-0.1514***
Ln(time)
(0.0309)
-0.6774***
Lagged Economic Growth
(0.2484)
-0.0126
Lagged Log of Total Trade
(0.0186)
0.1475***
Intensity of Civil Conflict
(0.0508)
0.2267***
SOUTHAM
(0.0698)
-0.1794**
SUBAFRICA
(0.0777)
0.1759**
SOUTHASIA
(0.0892)
-0.6488***
Constant
(0.2314)
Pseudo R2
-2Pseudologlikelihood

.0822
-1330.84

Wald χ2

246.89

Percent Correctly Classified

90.85%

NOTE: N=4752 leader years from 1960-2001, including 791 separate leaders. Robust standard errors, in
parentheses, are clustered on leaders. . In this specification one unit was added to aid/GDP before taking the
natural log to avoid dropping zeros.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 2. Censored Probit of Aid Allocation and Winning Coalition Failure
Winning Coalition
Aid Allocation
Failure
0.2348***
Logged Aid/GDP to Small Winning Coalition Systems
(0.0861)
Ln(time)*Logged Aid/GDP to Small Winning
-0.0264**
Coalition Systems
(0.0118)
-0.5355***
Logged Aid/GDP to Big Winning Coalition Systems
(0.1236)
Ln(time)*Logged Aid/GDP to Big Winning Coalition
0.0695***
Systems
(0.0179)
0.3354***
Big Winning Coalition
(0.1065)
-0.1612***
Ln(time)
(0.0338)
-0.7274***
Lagged Economic Growth
(0.2615)
0.0037
Lagged Log of Total Trade
(0.0203)
0.2348***
Intensity of Civil Conflict
(0.0861)
Probability of Leader‟s Winning Coalition Failing
0.0824***
(Instrument)
(0.0216)
5.0045***
Lagged Aid Receipt
(0.4120)
0.0707***
Lagged Population Growth
(0.0224)
0.1123
Lagged Imports from OECD Donor States
(0.0880)
-0.6978***
Natural log of Population
(0.1642)
-0.8590*
Lagged Economic Growth
(0.4769)
0.6229**
Winning Coalition Size
(0.2490)
0.6770***
Former Colony
(0.2159)
Defensive or Offensive alliance with an OECD donor
0.0156
state
(0.9622)
-0.8214**
Potential for Oil Production
(0.3898)
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Table 2 Continued
Constant
-2Log Pseudolikelihood
Wald χ2
ρ
Wald χ2 test of independent equations

-0.4423*
(0.2533)

0.0307
(0.7479)

-1410.392
201.07***
-.4778***
(.1410)
8.10***

Note: Total N=4,692 leader years of 791 separate leaders, 543 observations censored at selection stage. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. Significant coefficients for regional dummies of South America, Sub-Saharan
Africa and South Asia not reported in winning coalition failure equation.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 3. Censored Probit of Winning Coalition Failure and Aid Allocation Sub-Sample
Analysis by Era
Cold War
New World Order
Winning
Winning
Coalition
Aid
Coalition
Aid
Failure
Allocation
Failure
Allocation
Logged Aid/GDP to Small Winning
Coalition Systems

0.2644**
(0.1036)

0.5280**
(0.2198)

Ln(time)*Logged Aid/GDP to Small
Winning Coalition Systems

-0.0302**
(0.0146)

-0.0668**
(0.0297)

Logged Aid/GDP to Big Winning
Coalition Systems

-0.4658***
(0.1562)

-0.2820*
(0.1676)

Ln(time)*Logged Aid/GDP to Big
Winning Coalition Systems

0.0570***
(0.0217)

0.0400
(0.0253)

0.2055
(0.1370)

--

--

-0.7277***
(0.2556)

Ln(time)

-0.1471***
(0.0445)

-0.1004
(0.0612)

Lagged Economic Growth

-0.8242**
(0.3682)

-0.5869
(0.3946)

Lagged Log of Total Trade

-0.0221
(0.0251)

0.0183
(0.0433)

Intensity of Civil Conflict

0.1348**
(0.0672)

0.1537*
(0.0837)

Big Wining Coalition

Small Wining Coalition

Probability of Leader‟s Winning
Coalition Failing (Instrument)
Lagged Aid Receipt
Lagged Population Growth

0.1040***
(0.0331)

0.1247*
(0.0705)

4.9610***
(0.5596)
0.1425*
(0.0850)

7.3207***
(0.9605)
0.0089
(0.0700)
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Table 3 Continued
Lagged Imports from OECD Donor
States

0.0156
(0.0964)

0.8841***
(0.2359)

Natural log of Population

-0.6563***
(0.2474)

-1.4562***
(0.3183)

Lagged Economic Growth

-0.5965
(0.7337)

0.1086
(0.7720)

Winning Coalition Size

0.4472
(0.3608)

0.2990
(0.4583)

Former Colony

0.7025***
(0.2671)

0.3385
(0.4359)

Defensive or Offensive alliance with
an OECD donor state

4,118.6030
(0.0000)

-2.6885***
(0.9403)

-0.8972*
(0.4728)

-1.2001**
(0.5851)

Potential for Oil Production

Constant

-0.5132
(0.3221)

0.8927
(1.0042)

-0.3671
(0.4214)

-7.0459***
(2.1313)

-2Log Pseudolikelihood

-917.6867

-448.4125

Wald χ2

141.28***

76.04***

-.4848**
(.1771)

-.6930
(.6926)

5.23**

0.41

ρ
Wald χ2 test of independent equations

NOTE: Cold War refers to 1960-1988; New World Order to 1989-2001. Cold War N= 3,176 leader years with
516 individual leaders and 332 observations censored at the allocation stage. For New Age N=1,516 leader years
with 382 individual leaders and 211 observations censored at allocation stage. Robust standard errors, in
parentheses, are clustered on leaders. Significant coefficients for regional dummies of South America, SubSaharan Africa and South Asia not reported in the coalition failure equations. Due to disproportionately small
numbers of small winning coalition countries receiving aid in the New Age, the reference category was switched in
that model to ease estimation. Rather than Logged aid being interacted with an indicator for big winning coalitions
it is interacted with an indicator for small winning coalition systems.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Figure 2. Probability of Aid Allocation
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Fig.3 Change in Probability of Failure, Given
Drop from One Standard Deviation Above to the Mean of Aid
Nondemocratic Leaders
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NOTE: Reported Statistic is the mean of 10,000 draws from the variance-covariance matrix of the
censored probit reported in Table##. Dashed lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. Democratic
leaders defined by W scores greater or equal to .75; nondemocratic leaders, by W scores below .75.
Dashed vertical line markst the 50% mark in the distribution of failure times for leader type. Note
that the Y-axis scales are not equivalent across panels.
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Appendix I: Supplementary Materials
Table A1. Probit Regression of Aid Allocation

Probability of Leader‟s Winning Coalition
Failing (Instrument)

0.0631***
(0.0208)

Lagged Aid Receipt

4.5245***
(0.3559)

Lagged Population Growth

0.0627***
(0.0216)

Lagged Imports from OECD Donor States

-0.5806***
(0.1413)

Natural log of Population

0.0702
(0.0769)

Lagged Economic Growth

-0.4455
(0.7901)

Winning Coalition Size

-0.7961*
(0.4556)

Former Colony

0.4915**
(0.2162)

Defensive or Offensive alliance with an
OECD donor state

0.4602**
(0.2020)

Potential for Oil Production

-0.6985**
(0.3299)

Internationalized Civil Conflict

0.9786**
(0.4846)

Constant

0.2036
(0.6221)

Pseudo R2
-2 Pseudologlikelihood

.8413
-267.945

Wald χ2

339.30

Percent Correctly Classified

98.21%

NOTE: N=4,752 leader years from 1960-2001 including 791 individual leaders. Robust standard errors, in
parentheses, are clustered on leaders.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table A2. Censored Probit of Winning Coalition Failure and Aid Allocation using Polity
Dummy for Regime Type
Winning Coalition
Aid Allocation
Failure
0.2102***
Logged Aid/GDP to Polity Democracy
(0.0760)
Ln(time)*Logged Aid/GDP to Polity Democracy

-0.0274***
(0.0102)

Logged Aid/GDP to Polity Democracy

-0.4224***
(0.1269)

Ln(time)*Logged Aid/GDP to Polity Democracy

0.0565***
(0.0186)

Polity Democracy

0.3022***
(0.0862)

Ln(time)

-0.1139***
(0.0290)

Lagged Economic Growth

-0.6964***
(0.2602)

Lagged Log of Total Trade

-0.0036
(0.0165)

Intensity of Civil Conflict

0.1051**
(0.0450)

Probability of Leader‟s Winning Coalition Failing
(Instrument)

0.0558***
(0.0184)

Lagged Aid Receipt

4.9624***
(0.3800)

Lagged Population Growth

0.0815***
(0.0289)

Lagged Imports from OECD Donor States

0.1138
(0.0828)

Natural log of Population

-0.6336***
(0.1465)

Lagged Economic Growth

0.0006
(0.0319)

Winning Coalition Size

0.5867**
(0.2356)
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Table A2. Continued
0.7199***
(0.2078)

Former Colony
Defensive or Offensive alliance with an OECD
donor state

0.1229
(0.9493)
-0.7294**
(0.3692)

Potential for Oil Production
Constant

-0.4130*
(0.2187)

-0.8929
(0.6435)

-2LogPseudolikelihood

-1829.491

Wald χ2

272.88***

ρ

-.5186***
(.1188)

Wald χ2 test of independent equations

12.50***

NOTE: N=4947 leader years from 1960-2001 including 820 individual leaders, with 585 censored at the allocation
stage. Significant coefficients for regional dummies of South America, Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia not
reported in failure equation. Robust standard errors, in parentheses, clustered on leaders.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Fig. A1 Estimated Baseline Survivor Function
from NPH Cox Model of Winning Coalition Failure

0

5000

10000
analysis time

15000

20000

